

# MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES AND ACTION PLANS

## Methodology



REGIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVE

2015



# **Monitoring and Evaluation of the Implementation of National Anti-corruption Strategies and Action Plans**

## **Methodology**

developed for the Regional Anti-corruption Initiative (RAI)

by Tilman Hoppe

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The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Regional Anti-corruption Initiative or its member States.

**Publisher**

Regional Anti-corruption Initiative

**Editor**

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Tilman Hoppe, Anti-corruption Expert, Dr. iur., LL.M.

**Proofreader**

Vera Devine

**Design and Print**

UrbanGraf, Sarajevo

**Edition**

300 copies

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CIP - Katalogizacija u publikaciji  
Nacionalna i univerzitetska biblioteka  
Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo

343.352(4-12)

HOPPE, Tilman

Monitoring and evaluation of the implementation  
of national anti-corruption strategies and action  
plans : methodology developed for the Regional  
Anti-corruption Initiative (RAI) / by Tilman  
Hoppe. - Sarajevo : Regional Anti-corruption  
Initiative, 2015. - 51 str. : ilustr. ; 25 cm

Bibliografske i druge bilješke uz tekst.

ISBN 978-9926-8016-0-1

COBISS.BH-ID 22093574



*The establishment of a regular monitoring process is important as a means of identifying, deterring and taking account of non-compliance.*

*United Nations Guide on Anti-Corruption Policies, p. 97*



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## Foreword

After embarking on the path of democracy, the countries in South Eastern Europe faced the consequences generated by the anti-social and demoralizing phenomenon of corruption. The level of corruption varied from country to country, but all of them encountered periods in which they were severely affected by it. Fraud and malfeasance have penetrated a wide range of sectors, such as healthcare, education and judiciary. It also reached the political sphere and electoral campaigns.

In this context, the fight against corruption demanded a systemic and coordinated approach. The governments in the region took a strategic attitude, developing and implementing anti-corruption policy documents and action plans. The first strategies on anti-corruption were developed in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the late 1990s and, now, the entire region comes to the fourth generation of anti-corruption strategies. I believe this is a remarkable progress. Countries benefited from valuable recommendations from existing international evaluation mechanisms such as those of the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the United Nations. Civil society had also an important role to play in improving the processes. There were a lot of lessons learned by each and every country, and knowing and sharing these practices are valuable sources to more effectively plan the fight against corruption, including at regional level.

The Regional Anti-corruption Initiative was created to provide a platform for regional cooperation and coordination in the fight against corruption in South Eastern Europe. Its goal, inter alia, is to serve as a focal point for regional anti-corruption collaboration through facilitation of best practices and the dissemination of lessons learned. At this angle of a new generation of anti-corruption strategies, there is a lot to grasp from past experience, including when it comes to monitoring and evaluating the implementation of anti-corruption policies.

This Methodology seeks to enable policy makers to establish efficient monitoring and evaluation mechanisms so as to get the best from an implementation process. It builds on experiences from the implementation of three generations of anti-corruption strategies, established best practices and, most important, recommendations generated in these regards by assessments of GRECO and OECD. It provides detailed information on every single aspect of monitoring and evaluation from an anti-corruption angle and can serve as a useful guide when deciding on respective mechanisms of an anti-corruption strategy and action plan. The Regional Anti-corruption Initiative stands ready to further cooperate with its member states on applying this Methodology.

I am grateful to its author, Dr. Tilman Hoppe, for the concise and comprehensive quality of the Methodology. I am grateful also to the Regional Anti-corruption Initiative Representatives who reviewed and provided important inputs to this work.

Radu Cotici






Head of the Regional Anti-corruption Initiative Secretariat





## Introduction

This publication is the result of research conducted between November 2014 and February 2015 under the guidance of the Secretariat of the Regional Anti-corruption Initiative. The research used information from the following sources:

- National anti-corruption strategies and action plans from South-Eastern Europe and other regions;
- Publications on anti-corruption policies, in particular the following:
  -  Richard Heeks/Harald Mathisen, “Understanding Success and Failure of Anti-Corruption Initiatives”, U4 Brief, March 2011:2;<sup>1</sup>
  -  Tilman Hoppe/Council of Europe, “Designing and Implementing Anti-corruption Policies”, 2013 (English, Russian);<sup>2</sup>
  -  Karen Hussmann (ed.), “Anti-corruption policy making in practice: What can be learned for implementing Article 5 of UNCAC?”, U4 Report 1:2007;<sup>3</sup>
  -  OECD, Proceedings of the Seminar on “Anti-corruption policy and integrity”, March 2011;<sup>4</sup>
  -  UNODC, “United Nations Guide on Anti-Corruption Policies”, 2003.<sup>5</sup>
- Exchanges with various experts on anti-corruption policies.

This publication could not have been produced without the invaluable help of colleagues from across a wide range of organisations. The author is particularly grateful to the following individuals (the content being solely his own responsibility):

- Radu Cotici, Ph.D. (Head of Secretariat, Regional Anti-corruption Initiative – RAI);
- Vladimir Georgiev, State Commission for Prevention of Corruption, Republic of Macedonia;
- All speakers of the Regional RAI Conference on “Trends and Challenges in Implementing Anti-corruption Strategies”, Skopje, 25 November 2014.

<sup>1</sup> [www.cmi.no/publications/file/3978-understanding-success-and-failure-of-anti.pdf](http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3978-understanding-success-and-failure-of-anti.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> [www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Projects/EaP-CoE%20Facility/Publication/Handbook%20on%20AC%20policies\\_EN%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Projects/EaP-CoE%20Facility/Publication/Handbook%20on%20AC%20policies_EN%20(2).pdf)

<sup>3</sup> [www.cmi.no/publications/file/2914-anti-corruption-policy-making-in-practice.pdf](http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/2914-anti-corruption-policy-making-in-practice.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> [www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/17/47912383.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/17/47912383.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> [www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/UN\\_Guide.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/UN_Guide.pdf)



## Executive Summary

In South-Eastern Europe, as in any other geographical region, countries often draft state-of-the-art anti-corruption strategies and action plans. However, in most cases, insufficiently rigorous **implementation** mars the achievement of the objectives set out in these strategies and action plans.

Over the past decades, a consensus has emerged on **political will** being the most important condition for effective implementation: all three powers of state and civil society, including the media, truly wanting reforms. Nonetheless, wanting anti-corruption reforms and allocating the necessary resources are not enough. There will always be stakeholders in the system who will be lazy, or who will feel threatened by the implementation of actions: anti-corruption reforms often work directly against the interests of stakeholders that will be in charge of seeing the reforms through. In addition, even without bad intentions, implementation of actions can get stuck in inefficient management; failed communications; or a lack of structured planning. A solid system of **monitoring** the implementation of anti-corruption strategies and action plans can contribute to overcoming these obstacles.

Well-formulated **indicators** are the foundation for monitoring: each state entity responsible for the implementation of certain actions needs to provide conclusive and comprehensible data when reporting on progress, going beyond any indicator which might turn out inconclusive or too narrow. **IT-solutions** can facilitate structured input; render paper work unnecessary; provide data in real time; and allow for easy public reporting. Ideally, the monitoring body is connected through a web application with all reporting entities. Such IT-solutions are a great **incentive** to facilitate reporting, as are clear institutional and individual responsibilities, high-level endorsed instructions, and progress reports being **available to the public**.

A **monitoring/coordination body** – with sufficient human resources to carry out its mandate – needs to review data on progress, and to coordinate the different stakeholders responsible for implementation. If the monitoring body is a commission, it should comprise of a diversity of stakeholders, including **civil society**; otherwise, it should ensure to consider civil society feedback. In any case, civil society needs to be able to provide comments which the entities responsible for implementation should consider.



Implementation bodies should apply **result-oriented** management with their staff to facilitate achieving objectives. In addition, it is indispensable for monitoring bodies to not only react to the progress made, but to actively inform all stakeholders from the beginning on their particular role and responsibility, and to point out the benefit of doing so.

It is necessary to review the overall success of an anti-corruption policy at least once during its time-span. The **evaluation** should be transparent and result in recommendations on any necessary update of actions.



## PART 1: REGIONAL EXPERIENCES AND THE NEED FOR A METHODOLOGY

### 1 The need for a methodology on monitoring and implementation

International standards on anti-corruption strategies exist since 2003. They address the necessity of anti-corruption strategies and action plans, and call for their coordinated implementation. However, the recommendations by these international standards remain rather abstract:

*United Nations Convention Against Corruption<sup>6</sup>*

*Article 5, para. 1, Preventive anti-corruption policies and practices*

*Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, develop and implement or maintain effective, **coordinated** anticorruption policies that promote the **participation of society** and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability.*

*Article 60 Training and technical assistance*

*Each State Party shall, to the extent necessary, initiate, develop or improve specific **training programmes** for its personnel responsible for preventing and combating corruption. Such training programmes could deal, inter alia, with the following areas: [...] (b) Building capacity in the development and planning of strategic anticorruption policy [...].*

*European Union*

*Ten Principles for Improving the Fight against Corruption in Acceding, Candidate and other Third Countries, 2003,<sup>7</sup> Principle 1*

*To ensure credibility, a clear stance against corruption is essential from leaders and decision-makers. Bearing in mind that no universally applicable recipes exist, national **anti-corruption strategies** or programmes, covering*

<sup>6</sup> [www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/) (emphasis by author).

<sup>7</sup> Annex to the Communication from the [European] Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee – On a comprehensive EU policy against corruption (COM/2003/0317 final), [http://eurlex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga\\_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type\\_doc=COMfinal&an\\_doc=2003&nu\\_doc=317](http://eurlex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=COMfinal&an_doc=2003&nu_doc=317) (emphasis by author).



*both preventive and repressive measures, should be drawn up and **implemented**. These strategies should be subject to broad consultation at all levels.”*

Since 2009, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides some more concrete guidance in its “Technical Guide to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption”:

*“The UNCAC [United Nations Convention Against Corruption] approach to prevention of corruption is premised on the need for a coherent framework that moves from general principles to clear and realistic strategies, action plans and procedures, and regular **monitoring** of implementation of measures to apply the strategy. This requires a comprehensive and **coordinated** approach, from the systematic collection and collation of **quantitative** and **qualitative** information on the basic situation in the country, to a strategy that sets overall goals that are then translated into **objectives** and action plans in order to enable comparison with the **results** achieved and enable **adjustments** to the policies and their implementation. The processes of drafting, adoption, implementation and monitoring and assessment of the strategy should be planned, led and coordinated among all relevant **stakeholders** (public and private sectors, civil society) and cover the full range of sectors or areas where corruption might occur.”<sup>8</sup>*

In addition, the Council of Europe’s “Group of States against Corruption” (GRECO) has monitored its members since 2000. Anti-corruption strategies and their implementation were mainly subject of the First Evaluation Round. Its recommendations largely reflect above-quoted international standards. By way of example, one can quote the following Evaluation Report of 2002:

*“[GRECO recommends] to take further steps to ensure the implementation of the Programme and Action Plan and the continuous **monitoring** of the implementation of existing legislation in the anti-corruption area. For these purposes, one of the possibilities could be to establish a cross-cutting **monitoring Commission** (possibly linked to the Parliament, and comprising representatives of the various governmental bodies – including [...] civil society and the business community). This commission could also be in*

<sup>8</sup> Of 2009, Article Commentary II.2, page 4, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/technical-guide.html> (in English and Russian); emphasis by author.



*charge of the continuous **adaptation** of the Programme and Action Plan to the **progress achieved** and/or new problems arising [...].”<sup>9</sup>*

Or in a nutshell, the following observation by GRECO in 2008 seems to be quintessential:

*The [...] authorities have launched an articulated anticorruption strategy, based on both preventive and repressive mechanisms, where **objectives**, activities, **deadlines** and **indicators** of achievement are framed and **monitored**.*<sup>10</sup>

In 2012, GRECO summarised the importance of a functioning implementation mechanism in its “Lessons learnt from the three Evaluation Rounds (2000-2010)” as follows:

*“[S]trategies should not amount to mere declarations of intent. In order to be credible they must be **co-ordinated** and must comprise **definite**, **measurable** objectives. It must be ensured that they are **implemented** and periodically **evaluated** and **adapted**. GRECO has therefore recommended, in certain cases, adopting detailed plans of action and having the strategies and plans of action reviewed and implemented by bodies vested with the **authority** and the appropriate level of **resources** for this task.”<sup>11</sup>*

However, little if any detailed guidance on monitoring and evaluating anti-corruption strategies exists so far, neither for the South-Eastern European region, nor beyond. The only publication is the Council of Europe handbook on “Designing and Implementing Anti-corruption Policies” of 2013, which focuses on experiences from Eastern Europe.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, a methodology on monitoring and evaluating the implementation of national anti-corruption strategies and action plans is long overdue.

<sup>9</sup> GRECO, 1st Round Evaluation, Evaluation Report Croatia, 2002, page 32, recommendation iii, [http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).

<sup>10</sup> GRECO, Joint 1st and 2nd Round Evaluations, Compliance Report Montenegro, 2008, no. 108, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports%28round2%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports%28round2%29_en.asp)

<sup>11</sup> [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/Compendium\\_Thematic\\_Articles\\_EN.pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/Compendium_Thematic_Articles_EN.pdf) (emphasis by author).

<sup>12</sup> Drafted by Tilman Hoppe, [www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Projects/EaP-CoE%20Facility/Publication/Handbook%20on%20AC%20policies\\_EN%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Projects/EaP-CoE%20Facility/Publication/Handbook%20on%20AC%20policies_EN%20(2).pdf) (in English and Russian).



## 2 Regional experiences

South-Eastern Europe has undergone tremendous changes in its anti-corruption framework during the past 15 years. Back in the early 2000s, GRECO regularly observed the non-existence or deficiency of anti-corruption strategies. For example, in 2001 and 2002 it observed:

*“[T]here is a need to **develop** a national programme on the fight against corruption, where not only repressive measures but also prevention and public awareness elements are included. It is hoped that the recently adopted National Strategy for Combating Corruption carries the needed initiatives in this respect. In addition, the creation of a body for the **co-ordination** of an overall strategy against corruption would be an advantage. [The country] [...] has made more progress in developing a legal framework for combating corruption, than is the case with the **implementation** of the laws.”<sup>13</sup>*

*“The GET [GRECO Evaluation Team] considers that if corruption and corrupt behaviour are to be defeated [...], a comprehensive long term and pragmatic **strategy** is required, by which priorities for action are defined and all relevant agencies involved are associated. Public officials at all levels must receive information about anti-corruption measures to be introduced. At the same time, the public must be made aware of the measures undertaken and of the efforts made and results obtained. Therefore, the GET recommended to adopt a comprehensive national anti-corruption strategy, as well as raise awareness among public officials and the public about the danger entailed by corruption.”<sup>14</sup>*

Acknowledging the importance of anti-corruption strategies and implementing mechanisms, their existence was a pre-requisite for accession of candidate countries to the European Union:

*The European Commission expects accession candidates to “develop a National Strategy for Prevention of Corruption and Combating Corruption*

<sup>13</sup> GRECO, 1st Round Evaluation, Evaluation Report Bulgaria, 2001, no. 122, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).

<sup>14</sup> GRECO, 1st Round Evaluation, Evaluation Report Macedonia, 2002, no. 101, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).



*and ensure the necessary coordination of competent Government offices and bodies with regard to operational **implementation**.*<sup>15</sup>

Today, all countries in the region have well-developed anti-corruption strategies with monitoring and evaluation structures; Macedonia even calls a fully web-based reporting and monitoring system its own, with other countries planning to set up similar applications.

This dynamic development in the region is a rich source of experiences from which a methodology on monitoring and evaluating strategies can draw. It provides specific examples and guidance on what above cited international standards mean in detail. To this end, the following is a compilation of the most important observations on monitoring and evaluating as done mainly by GRECO, but also by other stakeholders, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Feedback from practitioners given at international workshops complements the assessments. All observations are grouped under the following key issues for monitoring and evaluating, reflecting the structure of the suggested Methodology in Part 2 of this study:

### **Necessity of monitoring**

In the past, it has been a recurrent theme of monitoring reports that anti-corruption strategies exist rather on paper than being living documents in practice:

*"[A]nti-corruption strategies have been adopted or are being elaborated. However, the **existence alone** of these strategies is not an indication of the will to seriously fight corruption.*<sup>16</sup>

*The country "must focus mainly on implementing the already existing rules and tools rather than [...] adopting **formal strategies**.*<sup>17</sup>

*"The existence of the Anti-corruption Strategy 2009-2014 has not contributed to the advancement of anti-corruption reforms. Now in its third*

<sup>15</sup> Council Decision of 13 September 2004 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the European Partnership with Croatia (2004/648/EC), at no. 3.1, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32004D0648>

<sup>16</sup> OECD/SIGMA Assessment Bosnia and Herzegovina 2012, page 47, [www.sigmaxweb.org/publications/public-governance-assessment-reports.htm](http://www.sigmaxweb.org/publications/public-governance-assessment-reports.htm) (emphasis by author).

<sup>17</sup> OECD/SIGMA Assessment Kosovo\* 2012, page 15, [www.sigmaxweb.org/publications/public-governance-assessment-reports.htm](http://www.sigmaxweb.org/publications/public-governance-assessment-reports.htm) (emphasis by author).





*year, the Strategy remains for the most part **unimplemented** and has little influence on politicians and political parties.”<sup>18</sup>*

*“As a consequence, although policy papers and a regulatory framework for fighting corruption do exist, the **absence of implementation** remains a huge problem.”<sup>19</sup>*

The solution proposed by the monitors is as simple as follows:

*GRECO “recommends that the Action Plan for the implementation of the National Anti-corruption Strategy be adopted and that an efficient **monitoring** of its implementation is ensured.”<sup>20</sup>*

*GRECO “is of the opinion that if the recently adopted Strategy is to overcome its current descriptive and programmatic character, it must be provided with an adequate mechanism to **assess its impact** on the prevention and the fight against corruption.”<sup>21</sup>*

Obviously, the assumption underlying above recommendations is that there is sufficient will to make the strategy and the monitoring of its implementation a meaningful exercise. Clearly, monitoring cannot remedy a lack of political will. There are many examples of countries, where the monitoring function has been brought to perfection, but this has done little to improve the rate of implementation. In fact, a lack of implementing the monitoring mechanism itself has been a frequent observation by state or civil society experts.

## Indicators

Without indicators, there is no monitoring of the success of an anti-corruption strategy. To this extent, from early on the lack of indicators was subject of criticism:

<sup>18</sup> OECD/SIGMA Assessment Bosnia and Herzegovina 2012, page 32, <http://www.sigmaxweb.org/publications/public-governance-assessment-reports.htm> (emphasis by author).

<sup>19</sup> OECD/SIGMA Assessment Albania 2012, page 13, [www.sigmaxweb.org/publications/public-governance-assessment-reports.htm](http://www.sigmaxweb.org/publications/public-governance-assessment-reports.htm) (emphasis by author).

<sup>20</sup> GRECO, Joint 1st and 2nd Round Evaluations, Evaluation Report Serbia, no. 90, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports%28round2%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports%28round2%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).

<sup>21</sup> GRECO, 2nd Round Evaluations, Evaluation Report Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 68, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports%28round2%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports%28round2%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).



*"No **indicators** of achievement have been specified to assess whether tasks and deadlines have been met."*<sup>22</sup>

One practitioner pointed out that the lack of (suitable) indicators can in fact disengage the public in the fight against corruption:

*"There is still a very high degree of mistrust in [...] society and people think corruption is increasing, despite the objective data pointing at the opposite direction. One of the main reasons for such [a] situation is [the] **absence of indicators** for [the] practical impact of the strategies, creating an overwhelming impression that 'nothing or little has been done in practice'."*<sup>23</sup>

It is also interesting to note that the absence of indicators prevents the public from tracing whether anti-corruption measures are in fact a causal result of the strategic effort, or an outside influence:

*"Often anti-corruption measures were implemented not because or on the basis of the strategies 2005 – 2007 or 2008 – 2010 but were results of some **other endeavours** of the institutions concerned."*<sup>24</sup>

Although international or civil society observers consistently lament the absence or quality of indicators, there has been very limited guidance by any of the international organisations on what meaningful indicators constitute. One of the main observations by practitioners has been that indicators initially focused too much on outputs and quantitative results, something which strategies of later generations remedied:

*"The monitoring of the Strategy implementation, in comparison to the previous one, will focus not only on the quantitative results, but the **qualitative** ones as well, i.e. on the effects of the implementation of the set measures."*<sup>25</sup>

For practitioners, both from state bodies and from civil society organisations, indicators have been one of the main frustrations when monitoring implementation of actions: on the one hand, indicators are often too ambitious, rendering their verification impossible

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid (emphasis by author).

<sup>23</sup> OECD, Proceedings of the Seminar on "Anti-corruption policy and integrity", March 2011, "Developing a comprehensive national anti-corruption strategy for Romania", Cornel-Virgiliu Calinescu, page 32, [www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/47912383.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/47912383.pdf) (emphasis by author).

<sup>24</sup> Ibid (emphasis by author).

<sup>25</sup> OECD, Proceedings of the Seminar on "Anti-corruption policy and integrity", March 2011, "Effective Strategic Anti-Corruption Framework – Lessons Learned and Challenges from Montenegrin experience", Vesna Ratković, Montenegro, page 25, [www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/17/47912383.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/17/47912383.pdf) (emphasis by author).



or at least requiring excessive efforts, such as surveys (e.g. for the indicator “less bribes are paid at customs offices”). On the other hand, making indicators less ambitious exposes them to criticism that they cover the success only partially and do not focus enough on impact, but only mirror the output (e.g. “an online system for customs declarations is set up”).

### Reporting by state bodies

In the early stages of anti-corruption strategies, one of the main frustrations of practitioners was the non-existent or chaotic practice of reporting on progress towards indicators:

*“As far as the national programme for combating crime, corruption and nepotism over the period from 1999 to 2002 was concerned, the GET [GRECO Evaluation Team] was unable to obtain much information about its development, follow-up action or the results produced. Although the people the team met during the visit were aware of the programme’s existence and, in some cases, its main thrusts, they were often **unable to provide details** about its implementation, even in the particular public service that employed them. The GET therefore concluded that the programme had been inadequately publicised, both in the public services involved in fighting corruption and in the media and society at large. Yet effective action against corruption is not possible unless public servants and, more generally, the wider population are closely involved in the authorities’ efforts by means of transparent and regular information on the measures taken, their implementation and the results produced.”<sup>26</sup>*

One of the main challenges throughout the region has been the paper-based reporting on progress. Initially, in some instances even uniform templates were missing for reporting entities, which made the consolidation and analysis of the data hard if not impossible. At the same time, reporting entities often felt discouraged by having to fill out the papers, all the more when the outcome of the paperwork remained unclear. For this reason, Macedonia underwent a transition from a paper-based reporting system to an email-based system, until it finally established a web-based reporting system (see below Part 2 “Methodology”).<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> GRECO, 1st Round Evaluation, Evaluation Report Moldova, 2002, no. 85, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).

<sup>27</sup> Booklet on the web-application: [www.dksk.org.mk/images/upatsvoinstitucijabooklet\\_dp.pdf](http://www.dksk.org.mk/images/upatsvoinstitucijabooklet_dp.pdf) (in Macedonian).



As for the structure of reporting, the OECD noted the following as a good example:

*“Since 2011 the national Commission publishes reports on the implementation of the anticorruption policy two or three times per year. The reports feature a combination of different types of data and assessment. First, **quantitative** data on the **absolute numbers** and percentages of the implemented, continuously implemented, partially implemented and not implemented measures, which are defined in the action plan for the implementation of the Strategy for the Fight against Corruption and Organized Crime (including a division into measures that were or were not due for implementation in the reporting period). Second, an **extensive table** provides a detailed overview of the actual **state of implementation** of each of the measures. Third, there is also some **qualitative** assessment of the implementation (non-implementation) of the measures.”<sup>28</sup>*

### Monitoring bodies

In a functioning (or possibly ideal) public administration, one could assume that all public entities would follow the prescribed directions and carry out all actions foreseen in strategic documents. Reality, though, has been different in most cases. Probably for this reason, international observers have been quite strict when it comes to the absence of a designated body responsible for monitoring progress towards indicators:

*“The authorities [...] have reported that **no specific body** to ensure the implementation of the National Programme against Corruption (adopted in March 2002), has been established, but that the Action Plan has been **followed** and the Programme implemented. [...] GRECO considers that the main objective of this recommendation is to establish a structure for a continuous monitoring of the implementation of anti-corruption measures. This has not yet been achieved.”<sup>29</sup>*

The call for establishing monitoring bodies echoed throughout the region during the first two rounds of GRECO monitoring:

<sup>28</sup> OECD/ACN, Prevention of Corruption in Public Sector in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, page 49 (to be published in 2015), <http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/library/>; the reports of the Montenegrin National Commission can be found (in English) under:

[www.antikorupcija.me/en/index.php?option=com\\_phocadownload&view=category&id=22:&Itemid=91](http://www.antikorupcija.me/en/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=22:&Itemid=91)

<sup>29</sup> GRECO, 1st Round Evaluation, Compliance Report Croatia, 2004, no. 12 f.,

[www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).



*It is recommended “to ensure a systematic assessment and evaluation of the effectiveness of the Anti-Corruption Strategy and its Action Plan through the setting up of an **independent anti-corruption body** with sufficient resources.”<sup>30</sup>*

*“GRECO recommended to develop a national programme for the fight against corruption, including preventive and repressive perspectives and to assign the overall co-ordination of its implementation to a **body especially tasked** for that purpose.”<sup>31</sup>*

As for the structure of the monitoring body, GRECO seemed to favour commissions consisting of a **multitude** of stakeholders:

*“The Government set up a Commission for the Implementation of the National Anti-corruption Strategy [...]. It is composed of **representatives** from different ministries, the judiciary, the National Assembly, the Anti-corruption Council, the media and non-governmental organisations. In addition, [...] the Anti-corruption Agency would be entrusted with the monitoring of the Anti-corruption Strategy and its Action Plan. It is envisaged that this monitoring will continue to benefit from the involvement of a **broad range of stakeholders**; for example, the members of the Agency's Management Board are to be nominated by both governmental and non-governmental bodies. The Agency is accountable to the **National Assembly** to whom it has to report annually concerning progress in implementation of the Anti-corruption Strategy and its Action Plan.”<sup>32</sup>*

GRECO also identified the establishment of **contact points** linking the implementing institutions with the monitoring body as good practice:

*“The Anti Corruption Monitoring Group (ACMG) is the executive body for the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Plan. The establishment of this multidisciplinary instrument is a great achievement in itself. Its structure, with the Permanent Unit as a combination of secretariat and research body as well as the link between the ACMG and the **contact points***

<sup>30</sup> GRECO, 2nd Round Evaluations, Evaluation Report Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2002, no. 68, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports%28round2%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports%28round2%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).

<sup>31</sup> GRECO, 1st Round Evaluation, Compliance Report Bulgaria, 2004, no. 14, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).

<sup>32</sup> GRECO, Joint 1st and 2nd Round Evaluations, Compliance Report Serbia, no. 58 f. (with the GRECO recommendation that an efficient monitoring of implementation is ensured being assessed as satisfactorily), [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports%28round2%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports%28round2%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).

*of other institutions and its direct input from the ‘SPA’ [Stability Pact Anti-corruption Initiative] initiative appears to be excellent.”<sup>33</sup>*

### Coordination

The issue of co-ordination is closely linked to monitoring. Monitoring is the analysis of progress towards indicators, whereas coordination is the active pursuit of ensuring of implementation. In practice, both terms are often used interchangeably and both functions are often assigned to one and the same body. In any case, it is the coordination which in the end puts political will and energy actively behind the strategic actions. In the words of GRECO, it is recommended

*“to establish a [...] body [...] responsible for bringing together the top managers of higher public authorities concerned by the fight against corruption and for **steering the work** of all subordinated bodies [...].”<sup>34</sup>*

Thus, international observers have called repeatedly for strong coordination mechanisms:

*“If all of these [anti-corruption] measures are fully implemented and enforced proactively at all levels, with full political support and **inter-institutional co-operation**, they will make a difference.”<sup>35</sup>*

*“The Anti-corruption strategy for the period 2009-2011 had a limited implementation score, and therefore low impact that was due to a large extent to lack of inter-institutional cooperation and **coordination**. Certain bodies or departments appear to lag behind as far as prevention is concerned.”<sup>36</sup>*

Endorsement “by the highest government levels”, and attaching the coordination and monitoring body to the “Prime Minister’s office” are among the suggestions by

<sup>33</sup> GRECO, 1st Round Evaluation, Evaluation Report Albania, 2002, no. 150, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).

<sup>34</sup> GRECO, 1st Round Evaluation, Evaluation Report Poland, 2002, no. 136, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).

<sup>35</sup> OECD/SIGMA Assessment Serbia 2012, page 23, [www.sigmaweb.org/publications/public-governance-assessment-reports.htm](http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/public-governance-assessment-reports.htm) (emphasis by author).

<sup>36</sup> Council of Europe, Project against Economic Crime in Kosovo\* (PECK), Assessment Report on compliance with international standards in the anti-corruption (AC) area, Cycle 1, 2013, page 28, [www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Projects/PECK-Kos/Assessments/2590\\_PECK\\_AC%20Assessment%20Report\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Projects/PECK-Kos/Assessments/2590_PECK_AC%20Assessment%20Report_FINAL.pdf) (emphasis by author).



practitioners for establishing a good practice.<sup>37</sup> Again, as is the case with monitoring, coordination can profit from nominating “individuals or departments responsible for the implementation of the future anti-corruption strategies”<sup>38</sup> (contact points). Whenever a strong coordination mechanism has been absent in the past, it could – in extreme cases – lead to the following scenario:

*“According to the Strategy, a number of institutions are obliged to adopt specific anti-corruption policies [...] [A] number of institutions have developed specific anti-corruption policies, including institution-specific codes of ethics; however, several representatives of the institutions and line ministries visited during the assessment were either **unaware** of the existence of the Strategy or explicitly stated that they were **not covered** by it and therefore had **no obligation** to develop anti-corruption policies.”<sup>39</sup>*

A special challenge stems from **local governments** as they enjoy certain autonomy. However, as one practitioner pointed out, it is a frequent

*“misunderstanding [...] what the **autonomy** of local communities entails: [...] Only few local communities reported on the implementation of the strategy.”<sup>40</sup>*

It is clear that local communities, too, need to report on their progress as envisioned by the national strategies. Although they do enjoy some autonomy in administering their own affairs, they are still bound by national laws and policies. In other words: local communities are not States within the State, but part of the State and its hierarchy. Thus, GRECO recommended,

*“that the **government** promotes anti-corruption policies and measures at local and regional levels and monitors their implementation.”<sup>41</sup>*

Similarly, Transparency International has called for coordination to

<sup>37</sup> OECD, Proceedings of the Seminar on “Anti-corruption policy and integrity”, March 2011, “Developing a comprehensive national anti-corruption strategy for Romania”, Mr. Cornel-Virgiliu Calinescu, page 35, [www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/17/47912383.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/17/47912383.pdf) (emphasis by author).

<sup>38</sup> OECD, Proceedings of the Seminar, *ibid*, page 36.

<sup>39</sup> OECD/SIGMA Assessment Bosnia and Herzegovina 2012, page 46, [www.sigmaweb.org/publications/public-governance-assessment-reports.htm](http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/public-governance-assessment-reports.htm)

<sup>40</sup> OECD, Proceedings of the Seminar, *ibid*, page 33 (emphasis by author).

<sup>41</sup> GRECO, 1st Round Evaluation, Evaluation Report Albania, 2005, no. 25, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).



“be established at **all levels of government**, with the necessary interaction between the public and private sector, and the permanent evaluation of real effects of its implementation in practice.”<sup>42</sup>

### Ensuring compliance

One of the greatest challenges in the past has been ensuring compliance: how can implementing entities be made to follow what is prescribed in an action plan? How do we know whether implementing entities really do what they report on? How can the monitoring body see for itself what implementation is like? An interesting option is the possibility of carrying out on-site controls, as GRECO observed in 2005:

*“[S]ince 2005, a deputy minister has been specifically tasked with the prevention of corruption and nepotism, with responsibility for a) setting up internal monitoring of compliance with anti-corruption rules by officials; b) ensuring monitoring of the implementation of institutional measures to prevent corruption; during the first 10 months of 2008, the heads of 9 public authorities presented to the **monitoring group** their reports on anti-corruption activities and eventually, the group decided to carry out **additional controls** within three ministries (Defence, Transport, Agriculture and Food industry) and addressed recommendations to these.”*<sup>43</sup>

In 2015, the OECD noted a similar mechanism, “thematic evaluation missions in public institutions”, as good practice:

*“As part of the measure, expert teams are formed (including civil society experts). The teams carry out evaluation visits in particular institutions.”*<sup>44</sup>

### Public access and participation

Availability of monitoring information to civil society, and participation of their representatives in the monitoring process has been one of the key issues where civil society organisations and international observers have called for improving current practice:

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<sup>42</sup> Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Monitoring of the implementation of BiH Anti-Corruption Strategy 2009-2014, First periodical report, December 2010, page 100, <http://ti-bih.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Monitoring-eng.pdf>

<sup>43</sup> GRECO, 2nd Round Evaluations, Compliance Report Moldova, 2005, no. 33, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports%28round2%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports%28round2%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).

<sup>44</sup> OECD/ACN, Prevention of Corruption in Public Sector in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, page 47 (to be published in 2015), [www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/library/](http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/library/)





*"[T]he implementation process appeared to be rather **closed and restricted** to Government circles. [...] Such an approach may [...] have a negative impact with regard to the awareness of the reforms by the public as well as to their support for the reforms in public administration."*<sup>45</sup>

*"[T]he **lack of information** to the public on the measures adopted and the results achieved in the fight against corruption, seems to hinder the trust in governmental institutions."*<sup>46</sup>

*"Managerial **opaqueness** is a key characteristic. It is very difficult to obtain **reliable data** on the management of the public administration. Although foreseen in the Action Plan for the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy and in the PAR [Public Administration Reform] Strategy itself, DoPA [Department of Public Administration] does not publish indicators on the implementation of the Law on Civil Service and other laws. Other institutions also very rarely do so."*<sup>47</sup>

Engaging the public through information on progress of anti-corruption reforms is the first step of engaging the public in the fight itself:

*"[E]ffective action against corruption is not possible unless public servants and, more generally, the wider population are closely involved in the authorities' efforts by means of **transparent and regular information** on the measures taken, their implementation and the results produced. Awareness-raising of this kind would make it possible to combat the sense of the corrupt (both bribers and bribe-takers) being able to act with impunity by highlighting the penalties applicable and illustrating the effectiveness of the investigations carried out, while also increasing public confidence in the actions of the country's leaders and the police and judicial authorities."*<sup>48</sup>

As good practice GRECO noted in this context the publicity of the work of the monitoring body itself:

<sup>45</sup> GRECO, Joint 1st and 2nd Round Evaluations, Evaluation Report Turkey, 2006, no. 195, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports%28round2%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/reports%28round2%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).

<sup>46</sup> GRECO, 1st Round Evaluation, Evaluation Report Hungary, 2003, no. 90, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).

<sup>47</sup> OECD/SIGMA Assessment Albania 2012, page 10, [www.sigmaweb.org/publications/public-governance-assessment-reports.htm](http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/public-governance-assessment-reports.htm) (emphasis by author).

<sup>48</sup> GRECO, 1st Round Evaluation, Evaluation Report Moldova, 2003, no. 85, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).



*“The secretariat of the group that monitors the anti-corruption Strategy invites **media** representatives to all its **meetings**. The latter then publish the results of its working sessions. For example, the group's meeting on 29 July 2005 considered the authorities' efforts over the previous three months to implement the action plan on the implementation of the Strategy, as well as the GRECO situation report. It was attended by correspondents from nearly all the country's **television channels** and representatives of the written **press**.”<sup>49</sup>*

The European Commission, too, is in favour of opening of the sessions of the monitoring body to the public, as noted in one progress report:

*“The National Commission responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Action Plan adopted its first report in April 2011. [...] The **sessions** of the National Commission became fully **open to the public** in June 2011. Cooperation with civil society in the fight against corruption has improved significantly. NGOs have actively contributed to enhancing the strategic framework.”<sup>50</sup>*

However, putting reports on a website or opening commission sessions to the public is not enough in itself. A certain quality of the publicly available data is conditional in order to make access to information meaningful:

*“The Department for Internal Administrative Control and Anti-corruption [...], dependent on the Prime Minister, monitored the implementation of the action plan related to the Government's Strategy for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption and for Transparent Governance 2008-2013 (hereafter referred to as the Anti-corruption Strategy). The monitoring report is presented in a **bureaucratic, formalistic** way, simply listing the activities carried out but without any analysis of the effects of these activities.”<sup>51</sup>*

As a further step, inclusion of civil society representatives in the monitoring bodies is a standard recommendation by international observers:

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<sup>49</sup> GRECO, 1st Round Evaluation, Compliance Report Moldova, 2005, no. 13, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).

<sup>50</sup> European Commission, Montenegro 2011 Progress Report, page 13, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2011/package/mn\\_rapport\\_2011\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/mn_rapport_2011_en.pdf) (emphasis by author).

<sup>51</sup> OECD/SIGMA Assessment Albania 2012, page 12, [www.sigmaweb.org/publications/public-governance-assessment-reports.htm](http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/public-governance-assessment-reports.htm) (emphasis by author).



*“This could imply, for example, that **civil society** and the **private business** sector be more involved in the work of the [Anti Corruption Monitoring] Group, that the operational activities be more focused on public education and that the awareness of the Group among the public be promoted.”<sup>52</sup>*

The National Anti-Corruption Plan should be amended:

*“[e]xPLICITLY with a stronger notion of involvement of the **civil society** and the **business sector** in the implementation of the Plan.”<sup>53</sup>*

An EU-funded “Best Practices Manual” on civil society involvement underlined the following example as good practice in 2011:

*“In order to support the development, implementation and monitoring process, a number of five **cooperation platforms** have been created, to get a mechanism of information exchange, input and feedback. Among the five platforms three are dedicated to public administration, one is for the business environment and one for the civil society. The platforms are convoked by the Secretariat – Ministry of Justice –at least once every two months and include discussions such as the thematic evaluation process, the implementations reports, evolution in the implementation of the Strategy or information sessions. Civil society representatives can also participate in the meetings of the other platforms.”<sup>54</sup>*

### Necessity of evaluation

It is clear that monitoring provides “essential information for the substantive design of new strategic elements and the modification of existing ones as necessary.”<sup>55</sup> Using monitoring results for evaluating the previous strategic cycle in order to prepare the next strategic cycle is a good practice:

<sup>52</sup> GRECO, 1st Round Evaluation, Evaluation Report Albania, 2002, no. 150, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).

<sup>53</sup> GRECO, 1st Round Evaluation, Evaluation Report Albania, 2002, no. 142, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/reports%28round1%29_en.asp) (emphasis by author).

<sup>54</sup> Center for the Study of Democracy (and others), Civil Society Involvement in Drafting, Implementing and Assessing Anticorruption Policies, 2011, page 48, <http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17122>

<sup>55</sup> UNODC, United Nations Guide on Anti-Corruption Policies, 2003, p. 97, [www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/UN\\_Guide.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/UN_Guide.pdf) (emphasis by author).



*"[C]riticism has been made that the consultation process was not effective and that the action plan was prepared **without assessment** of the previous strategy."*<sup>56</sup>

*"[One] must focus mainly on implementing the already existing rules and tools rather than embarking in continuous amendments to the legislation, setting up new bodies and adopting formal strategies, usually **without assessing** the effectiveness of the **previous** laws, **strategies** and actions."*<sup>57</sup>

### 3 Conclusion

There is a multitude of observations made by different international and national experts on the quality of monitoring the implementation of anti-corruption strategies. All observations follow more or less the same line of thought. However, there is not yet any overall systematic picture, of how States should monitor and evaluate the implementation of their strategies. It is the aim of the Methodology in Part 2 (see below) to fill this gap.

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<sup>56</sup> OECD/SIGMA Assessment Kosovo 2012, page 12,

[www.sigmaweb.org/publications/public-governance-assessment-reports.htm](http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/public-governance-assessment-reports.htm) (emphasis by author).

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, page 15 (emphasis by author).



## PART 2: METHODOLOGY

### Chapter 1: The Cycle of Drafting, Implementing, and Monitoring

The strategic planning cycle for any strategy – not only in the field of anti-corruption – can be divided into four steps:



**Monitoring** ensures the implementation of strategic actions. It can be defined as “supervising activities in progress to ensure they are on-course and on-schedule in meeting the objectives and performance targets.”<sup>58</sup> To this end, the indicators for success of a strategy and action plan play a vital role: they are the benchmark against which one can monitor progress of implementation. Without monitoring, strategic documents can easily become empty promises, and all effort put into their drafting might be rendered futile. Therefore, the Council of Europe’s “Group of States against Corruption” (GRECO) has repeatedly called for “an efficient monitoring of [...] implementation [to be] ensured.”<sup>59</sup>

**Evaluations** ascertain that the experience from the implementation of a previous strategy is fed into the drafting of a follow-up strategy and also – if necessary – into adaptations of the current strategy.

Monitoring and evaluations are **intertwined**: monitoring is mainly focused on the existing strategic document, in above graphic, the right side of the cycle. However, monitoring data feeds also into the evaluation of a past strategy in order to prepare for a new one: without data on the implementation of a strategy and action plan, there is largely no

<sup>58</sup> [www.businessdictionary.com/definition/monitoring.html](http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/monitoring.html)

<sup>59</sup> GRECO, Joint 1st and 2nd Evaluation Round Report on Serbia, 23 June 2006, Eval I-II Rep (2005) 1E Revised, at no. 90, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/index\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/index_en.asp)



basis for assessing what went well with a strategy; what is left unfinished; and what should be redesigned. In the words of the United Nations Guide on Anti-Corruption Policies, monitoring provides “essential information for the substantive design of new strategic elements and the modification of existing ones as necessary.”<sup>60</sup>

## CHAPTER 2 MONITORING

Monitoring consists of three main elements:

- Setting **indicators** for successful implementation (benchmarks)
- **Reporting** on progress towards indicators
- Competent **stakeholders** analysing the data and following-up on compliance

### 1 The basis: indicators for measuring success

Setting indicators is not part of implementing a strategy, but rather of drafting it. Thus, the complex issue of formulating indicators is not the objective of this Methodology. However, when monitoring implementation, practitioners often face badly designed indicators. Therefore, this section provides some guidance on how to deal with such situations.

#### 1.1 Types of indicators

Indicators are formulated in response to the question: “How would we know whether or not what has been planned is actually happening or happened? How do we verify success?”<sup>61</sup> Although indicators are used to measure the success of projects, strategies, or other activities, there is no commonly shared consensus on types of indicators.

Following the understanding of the European Commission,<sup>62</sup> one can distinguish the following three types of “success”:

<sup>60</sup> United Nations Guide on Anti-Corruption Policies, *ibid*, p. 97.

<sup>61</sup> European Commission, Project Cycle Management Guidelines, 2004, page 80, [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/methodology-aid-delivery-methods-project-cycle-management-200403\\_en\\_2.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/methodology-aid-delivery-methods-project-cycle-management-200403_en_2.pdf)

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid*, page 82.



Success	Description	Example indicator
Output	Completion of action	New passport procedure in place
Outcome	Direct change because of output	Citizens can obtain passports within 3 days (before: several weeks)
Impact	Overall change because of outcome	Citizens pay less speed payments (bribes)

By this logic, output leads to outcome, which then leads to impact.

## 1.2 Challenges with indicators

A well formulated indicator will allow for clear and comprehensive monitoring.

*Indicator: “A law on corruption proofing is drafted and adopted in line with the ‘Ten Principles of Effective Corruption Proofing’ by RAI and a unit with 5 staff is established at the Ministry of Justice.”*

Once the law is adopted and the unit created, the indicator is fulfilled in terms of quantity; in terms of quality, one can point out the key features of the law complying with the RAI-principles.<sup>63</sup> However, not all indicators are formulated well. One frequently finds indicators such as the following:

*Indicator: “A law on corruption proofing is drafted and adopted.”*

*Problem: The indicator does not say anything on the **quality** of the draft law.*

*Indicator: “Public officials are trained on corruption proofing.”*

*Problem: The indicator does not say anything on the **quantity** of public officials. The indicator **misses** to include representatives of relevant civil society organisations.*

An incomplete indicator is not necessarily the result of neglect. Sometimes, the drafters of an action plan do not, yet, have enough information for making an indicator sufficiently precise. One could take, for example, the above incomplete indicator: “A law on corruption proofing is drafted and adopted”. The background for this somewhat incomplete indicator could simply be that the “Ten Principles of Effective Corruption Proofing” by RAI might not, yet, have been elaborated at the time when the action plan was drafted five years ago.

<sup>63</sup> [http://www.rai-see.org/doc/10\\_Principles\\_on\\_Effective\\_Corruption\\_Proofing.pdf](http://www.rai-see.org/doc/10_Principles_on_Effective_Corruption_Proofing.pdf)





Indicators pose complex dilemmas: many things cannot be measured. Whenever an indicator is incomplete, it is recommended to rectify any shortcoming by rewording the indicator as it should have been for the purpose of measuring it. In other words, one should always **amend** a badly formulated indicator in hindsight during the monitoring process. This can be done as follows:

### Quality

It is not an objective criterion – who should decide over it? The easiest way is to link the indicator to an **international standard**. However, often indicators call for laws or procedures to be adopted simply “in line with international standards”. A better way of formulating (and measuring) such a standard is with regards to **specific** international standards or specific examples of good practices.

Another good way of measuring quality is to link the success to a positive assessment by an **external** monitoring body, such as GRECO or OECD SIGMA

*Indicator: “The Law on Lobbying is drafted in line with international standards.”*

*Solution: “The Law on Lobbying is drafted in line with the **OECD’s ‘10 Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying’ and recommendations by GRECO’s 4<sup>th</sup> Round Evaluation.**”*

### Quantity

Probably the most frequent omission observed in this regard is the failure to provide meaningful quantification.

*Indicator: “100 school teachers are trained on ethics and gift giving each year.”*

*Problem: The indicator sounds as if providing a meaningful quantity. However, why 100? What is the total (baseline) of school teachers one could reach in the country – 100, 1,000 or 10,000? This additional information will make a huge difference to the reader and will provide a fair impression of how ambitious the activity actually is.*

*Solution: “100 school teachers **(out of a total of 500 currently employed)** were trained on ethics and gift giving in 2014. Including previous trainings, the total is currently 400 trained teachers.” With this addition, information on progress, the reader can easily calculate that the implementation of the action plan 2011-2015 is on a good way of training all 500 trainers by the end of 2015.*



### Measurability

Sometimes indicators appear to be measurable, but it turns out during monitoring they are actually not:

*Indicator: "Media is better informed about the mandate of the Court of Auditors."*

*Problem: The indicator itself needs an indicator – how to know that the media are better informed?*

*Solution: Proper reference to the mandate of the Court of Auditors in the media could be considered as an indicator. Monitoring should thus refer to the number of media articles: "At least 15 media articles made a proper reference to the mandate of the Court of Auditors."*

### Clarity

Monitoring bodies might also come across indicators which are actually not clear. The drafters of the indicators might have had a clear concept in mind; however, the indicator itself might be contradictory.

*Indicator: "The ratio of cases related to the declaration of property, income and interests considered by the Ethics Commission to the total number of cases considered by the Ethics Commission."*

*Problem: Shall a higher or lower ratio count as achievement? – Both could be considered a success.*

*Solution: "The ratio of cases related to asset declarations dropped, which should be considered a success as it points to greater compliance of public officials with their obligation of declaring (truthfully) and fewer incidents where citizens spot non-compliant declarations in the online database."*

### Information gaps

Monitoring bodies should also put themselves in the shoes of the public and what information needs it might have: Is there any additional information in which the reader might be interested?

*Indicator: "100 school teachers are trained on ethics and gift giving each year."*

*Problem: Report on progress might be meaningful in a quantitative way (see above): "100 school teachers (out of a total of 500 currently employed) were trained in 2014." However, it might be interesting for the reader to hear what "trained" means concretely: written instructions, a 1-hour presentation, or a half-day interactive seminar?*

*Solution: "100 school teachers (out of a total of 500 currently employed) were trained on ethics and gift giving in 2014. **The training consisted of a half-day interactive seminar (training material available at this web-link) by the Ministry of Education's ethics department.**"*



As often as it is possible to find a practical solution for indicators when monitoring progress, some indicators realistically will not work, such as the indicator under section 1.1: “citizens pay less speed payments”. How could one possible measure this? For this one indicator alone one would have to conduct sophisticated surveys establishing a causal link between a drop in bribes and the reform measure. Lessons learned on the feasibility of indicators are part of the feedback that goes into an evaluation procedure (see below at Chapter 3).

## 2 How to obtain information on progress

There are basically three sources for obtaining information on progress towards indicators:

- State bodies
- Civil society organisations
- International organisations

### 2.1 Reporting by state bodies

Reporting on progress should be the obligation of state bodies. Each entity responsible for the implementation of a certain action should also be responsible for reporting on progress.

#### 2.1.1 Content

Reports should contain quantitative data on the overall level of implementation, combined with a matrix on the quantitative and qualitative status of each action.

*In Albania, the Strategy 2008-2013 foresees annual reports on implementation based on a reporting template attached to the Strategy.*

#### 2.1.2 Frequency

International experience suggests that the reporting frequency varies between quarterly and annual reports.<sup>64</sup> State bodies should ideally report at least twice a year to ensure public scrutiny of progress (based on information publicly released).

<sup>64</sup> Tilman Hoppe/Council of Europe, Designing and Implementing Anti-corruption Policies, 2013 (English, Russian), page 56, [http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Projects/EaP-CoE%20Facility/Publication/Handbook%20on%20AC%20policies\\_EN%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Projects/EaP-CoE%20Facility/Publication/Handbook%20on%20AC%20policies_EN%20(2).pdf)



### 2.1.3 Paper templates

Any paper-based reporting requires templates: without such reporting templates, data flowing in at the monitoring body will be a mess. A standard structure of data contains the following elements:<sup>65</sup>

- General part
  - 👤 Identification of reporting entity and responsible person;
  - 👤 Reporting period.
- Actions
  - 👤 Objective identified in action plan;
  - 👤 Specific measure relating to the objective;
  - 👤 Update on status of each activity/measure:
    - 👤 Number and brief description of activity/measure;
    - 👤 Dates when new activities are implemented;
    - 👤 Progress towards indicator/benchmark;
    - 👤 Challenges;
    - 👤 Next steps (within timeframe).

For ease of following the numerous activities, a system of enumeration of objectives and activities is recommended in action plans, and the same enumeration should be followed in the reports.

### 2.1.4 IT-solutions

IT-solutions have several advantages. They

- force reporting entities to follow a pre-given input **structure**;
- render it obsolete to fill out **papers**, send them by mail, and subsequently enter the handwritten data into computers for aggregation and analysis;
- provide the monitoring body with data on the implementation status in **real time**;
- allow for easy reporting to the **public**, ideally in real time as well.


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<sup>65</sup> Ibid, page 55.

## Web application

Ideally, the monitoring body is connected through a web application with all reporting entities. Such a web application comprises of the following features:

- Each reporting entity has a designated **focal point** for reporting;
- All reporting entities have direct access to the web application via **internet**;
- The internet login is available as a **link** on the website of the monitoring body (e.g. the anti-corruption agency);
- Each focal point has an individual and **secure login** key to the web application;
- Each reporting entity can fill out only data in actions it is responsible for;
- The web application is open for a limited **time window** prior to the reporting deadline (e.g. once or twice a year) in order to ensure up-to-date data;
- The web application automatically **reminds** focal points via email of any current deadline for filling out the data; it also notifies the head of state body in case of non-reporting past deadline;
- The **input interface** of the web application provides for each action of the action plan (in its original order) additional fields for an update on the status:
  - 👉 Dates when new activities are implemented;
  - 👉 Progress towards indicator/benchmark;
  - 👉 Challenges;
  - 👉 Next steps ahead (within timeframe);
- **Drop down** menus facilitate standardised reporting (e.g. “action: completed, partially completed, uncompleted”);



*In Macedonia, a web-based application on the homepage of the DSKS links all institutions to an electronic reporting and monitoring system (<http://www.dksk.org.mk/>). It features also a guidebook:*





- In an extra field, the monitoring body can insert **specific guidance** or questions to the reporting bodies of certain actions, e.g. because the data provided in the previous year did leave some question marks;
- Each focal point receives **training** on the usage of the web application and on concise, informative reporting;
- A **guidebook** serves as additional written reference for users;
- The web application allows to automatically **analyse** the collected data statistically and to present it graphically in **charts**;
- The data is available to the public as **open source**, so civil society organisations can migrate and use it for their own analysis.

The costs for programming such a web application range roughly between 5,000 and 10,000 € depending on whether the software comes as open source with a full owner's licence.

### Offline applications

Even without an online reporting system, customised software can support the aggregation and analysis of all institutional reports.

### Simple IT-tools

Whenever a customised web application is not (yet) available, reports should still be in **electronic format** sent by email. This could, for example, be standardised excel charts, which the monitoring body could easily merge into one file; the advantage would be that it would result in having a file with data one can electronically sort and process.

An even easier solution would be tools for creating and **sharing work online**. The main example is "Google Docs".<sup>66</sup> It allows users to create and edit documents online while collaborating with other users live. The three apps are available for free as web applications; as apps that work offline; and as mobile apps for Android and iOS.

#### 2.1.5 Public access

One of the main functions of anti-corruption policies is to document the **commitment** of government and society in fighting corruption and to allow measuring delivery on this commitment. The commitment is not worth much if the public has no chance in scrutinising how the government lives up to its commitment. Public access to progress

<sup>66</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google\\_Docs](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Docs)



reports is thus key to implementing an anti-corruption policy. It also sets a strong incentive for public bodies to comply with indicators.

Public access means putting all progress reports online in machine readable format to allow for key word search, or for migrating part of the data, as civil society organisations might be interested in analysing the data their own way. An integrated **IT-solution** facilitates such online reporting to a great extent.

### **2.1.6 Incentives for reporting**

Low quality of data is often the main problem with reporting. Instead of precise, comprehensive, and fact-based data, there is vague or non-conclusive information. Besides clear indicators, the following incentives can facilitate reporting:

#### **Institutional responsibility**

A pre-requisite for a functioning reporting system are clear responsibilities on who is reporting on what. Whenever an action has several public entities as implementation partners, it needs to be clear who is in the lead.

#### **Individual responsibility**

Legislation or internal instructions should oblige managers of responsible units to ensure reporting. It should be clear that they are liable to disciplinary sanctions in case of substantial non-compliance.

#### **Clear instructions**

The anti-corruption policy should contain clear and easy-to-understand instructions on how reporting functions. The monitoring body should offer advice or short instructive workshops on reporting.

#### **High-level endorsement**

Whenever it is clear that reporting on progress of the anti-corruption policy is a top-level priority, public entities will also be more inclined to make it their own priority. This means, that ministers and agency directors will have to make the reporting their personal priority and sign off any report themselves.

#### **Public access**

Probably the main incentive for reporting is public access. If progress reports are available online, this creates competition between agencies, and pressure from the public. Should

online access be technically not (yet) possible, an aggregated report should show which institutions fulfilled their reporting obligations and which ones failed to do so.

### IT-support

An integrated IT-solution is technically not an incentive for complying with reporting obligations; it can, however, motivate reporting compared to a paper-based system. Normally, such an IT-tool would facilitate reporting: public entities would use a uniform user interface for drafting the action plan, and for reporting on its implementation. Thus, in practical terms, all public entities could access the user interface online, and easily fill in updates on progress in an input mask corresponding to each action. Ideally, information on progress would be available in real time to the monitoring body and to the public at large.

### On-site audits

If the monitoring body has the possibility of verifying progress reports through on-site audits (see below at no. 5), implementing entities would be automatically inclined to avoid triggering such an audit through incomplete or inconclusive progress reports.

## 2.2 Reporting from non-state stakeholders

Certain actions involve civil society organisations. For example, civil society organisations can assist in raising awareness on new anti-corruption laws among specific professional groups, for example the bar association with lawyers. However, this does not mean that non-state stakeholders should be obliged to report on the progress towards indicators. Action plans are **commitments** by the **State** – therefore, each action should contain a responsible state body for reporting. Wherever such a responsible state body is missing in the action plan, the monitoring body should designate one.

## 2.3 Other sources

The monitoring body should not confine itself to information received from state entities, only. There are two main reasons for this:

- State entities are in a constant **conflict of interest** when reporting on their own success. Relying on their information, only, would diminish the credibility of monitoring.
- Progress in fighting corruption happens largely at the interface between state entities and **citizens**. It is, thus, important how stakeholders outside the state perceive and experience progress.

Other sources of information for monitoring include the following:






- **Media** reports on corruption incidents; on citizens' perceptions and experiences; and on progress in reforms.
- Reports by **civil society** organisations on shortcomings and progress in implementing the action plan.
- Monitoring by **international organisations** can show progress towards indicators, by acknowledging reforms at institutional or procedural levels.

**Surveys** and **indicators** are a limited source for monitoring progress towards indicators:

- **Perception-based** surveys and indicators, such as Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) do not necessarily relate to actual corruption levels and do not allow distinguishing between different forms and sectors of corruption. For example, a country's drop in political corruption might lead to a better score in the CPI, whereas the level of everyday bribery could still be the same.
- **Experience-based** indicators and surveys, such as Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer, can point towards progress if their level of detail allows relating concrete experience of citizens to concrete anti-corruption actions.

### 3 Who should monitor



#### 3.1 Implementing state bodies

All state bodies responsible for implementing actions are naturally part of the monitoring process: The **head** of each state body will have to regularly monitor the status of implementation of actions related to his entity. However, such **internal monitoring** is not sufficient: First, each state body is in conflicts of interest when it comes to the success of its own actions; thus, without external control it seems likely that actions will often not

show progress. Secondly, monitoring also serves **external coordination** of actions. In the words of GRECO, it is recommended “to establish a [...] body [...] responsible for bringing together the top managers of higher public authorities concerned by the fight against corruption and for steering the work of all subordinated bodies [...].”<sup>67</sup>

### 3.2 Monitoring bodies

Most anti-corruption policies establish such above mentioned external monitoring bodies. One possible option is to entrust monitoring to an executive agency, such as an anti-corruption agency. The advantage of such a solution is the already existing capacity on corruption issues as well as already available expert staff. The advantage of a commission is the collegial combination of various stakeholders, including from civil society. Obviously, both models can also be combined, for example with an anti-corruption agency performing monitoring and a separate commission coordinating implementation. The following are the main features such a monitoring body should have (with some of the features only applying to commissions):

#### Composition

In the case of a commission, all main sectors responsible for implementation of the action plan should be represented. Ideally, representatives from all **three branches** (parliament, government, and judiciary) are included. Main players of the government typically are the Prime Minister’s office (responsible for coordination); the Ministry of Justice (responsible for legislation); and the Ministry of Interior or Public Administration (responsible for the civil service).

GRECO has made it clear that the implementation of anti-corruption policies should not be “restricted to Government circles. [...] Such an approach may [...] have a negative impact with regard to the awareness of the reforms by the public as well as to their support for the reforms in public administration.”<sup>68</sup> Hence, representatives of **civil society** (which includes the **business** sector) should be part of monitoring (or coordination) commissions as well. Again in the words of GRECO, it is necessary to establish “a cross-cutting monitoring Commission possibly linked to the Parliament, and comprising representatives

*In Croatia, the “National Council for Monitoring the Anti-Corruption Strategy” consists of representatives of Parliament, employers, unions, NGOs, academia, professional groups, and the media.*

<sup>67</sup> GRECO, 1st Evaluation Round Report on Poland, Eval I Rep (2001) 11E Final, 8 March 2002, at no. 136, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/index\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/index_en.asp)

<sup>68</sup> GRECO, Joint 1st and 2nd Evaluation Round Report on Turkey, Eval I-II Rep (2005) 3E, 10 March 2006, at no. 195, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/index\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/index_en.asp)



of the various governmental bodies – including [...] civil society and the business community”.<sup>69</sup> If there is a larger number of NGOs than seats available, it is usually a good solution to leave it up to the NGOs to select and nominate members among themselves.

**International organisations** do not participate directly in operational activities of state bodies. Hence, it would probably be rather unusual for their representatives to be members of monitoring bodies. However, they can – and should – at least be allowed to participate as guests in selected monitoring sessions (see below at “Public Access” of sessions).

### **Chair**

For the same reason of political weight, the chairperson of a commission should be a high-level figure, such as the Prime Minister; the head of the presidential administration; or the head of an anti-corruption body. The chairperson might be subject to voting or defined by regulation.

### **Frequency**

A monitoring commission needs to meet at least as often as is the frequency of reporting. Obviously, more frequent meetings are possible if coordination of implementation requires. The commission should also always have the option of *ad hoc* meetings.

### **Location**

Monitoring commissions can be attached to the Prime Minister’s office; a ministry; the parliament; or an anti-corruption body. In the case of parliament, an existing commission can even take on the function of monitoring. Again, political weight is a consideration, and, in addition, availability of expert staff to support the commission.

### **Function**

The function of a monitoring body usually comprises not only monitoring of progress, but also coordinating the implementation of actions. Sometimes, the coordination function is assigned to a separate body (see below at section 4 “Coordination”). Similar is true for evaluating the success of an anti-corruption policy (see below at Part 2 “Evaluation”).

### **Proceeding**

As a first step, monitoring necessitates verifying the reported data for completeness, consistency, and plausibility. The monitoring body should review at least a small sample

<sup>69</sup> GRECO, 1st Evaluation Round Report on Croatia, Eval I Rep (2002) 4E Final, 17 May 2002, at no. 140, [www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/index\\_en.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/index_en.asp)



of the reported data in more detail in order to set an incentive for accurate reporting. Based on the consolidated data, the monitoring body reviews the status of implementation; discusses challenges and obstacles; and sets out further actions required to achieve the objectives. In case of a commission, its members have to discuss and agree on the level of implementation for each action.

### **Staff and experts**

The monitoring body needs designated staff which ensures timely and informative reporting; collects the data; aggregates it; and advises on suggested actions. In case of a commission, the staff should come from the body to which the commission is attached (Prime Minister's office or anti-corruption body). Additional support can be provided by external, temporary experts, who can advise on how to overcome specific obstacles in implementation.

### **Public access and participation**

The monitoring body should provide public access to its work through sessions or roundtables which are at least occasionally open to the public or the media, and through information available to the public on the results of sessions. It is also an efficient option to let international monitoring experts participate in sessions so they get a quick picture of the status quo of anti-corruption reforms.

*In Bosnia, Transparency International issued two comprehensive reports on the "Analysis of the implementation level of the BiH Anti-corruption Strategy 2009-2014"*

*In Montenegro, the National Commission for monitoring of implementation of the Strategy 2010-2014 is supported by an expert team of the Directorate for Anticorruption Initiative. The domestic and international public is informed on the implementation of the Action Plan every six months.*

### **3.3 Civil society organisations**

Besides membership in a monitoring commission itself, civil society has several ways of participating in the monitoring of anti-corruption policies. NGOs can comment on the implementation of anti-corruption strategies by publishing self-initiated reports, or as a

formal cooperation partner of the monitoring body (NGOs could draft their own monitoring report, or could comment on the official report before it is finalised). Such external reports can have additional credibility as NGOs are not acting in the interest of the State. Online access to progress reports with open source data allows NGOs to migrate the data into their own applications for further evaluation and comments (see above 2.1.5).



### 3.4 International bodies

Often, important political pressure comes from international organisations. They have established their own monitoring mechanisms on compliance with international standards (Council of Europe's GRECO, European Union's progress review of enlargement candidates, OECD's SIGMA, UNODC's UNCAC review, etc.). Naturally, these monitoring mechanisms take into account progress on anti-corruption reforms including such foreseen in national action plans. While typically only touching on select parts of a national action plan, their value lies in the independence of the assessment.

## 4 Coordination

Monitoring is not just taking note of progress reports; oversight bodies also have to steer activities into the right direction, in particular when an action is not implemented according to plan. Coordination includes in particular the following measures:<sup>70</sup>

- **Leadership:** Ensure there is a responsible person with the necessary hierarchical weight in charge of implementation;
- **Communication:** Ensure exchange where implementation of particular measures depends on cooperation of several agencies;
- **Timelines:** Whenever a timeline has been too tight, a new timeline needs to be set. It is recommended to document the change of timelines in the action plan by making the old and new timelines transparent;
- **Budget, staff:** The implementation body can initiate allocation of budget or staff for the action in question;
- **Update:** Sometimes parts of an action plan need to be reviewed and re-designed.

Technically speaking, the monitoring commissions themselves have no hierarchical authority over other state bodies. They can only provide recommendations on the implementation of the action plan. Therefore, **high-level members** (ministers etc.) can give the monitoring commission political weight and *de facto* authority.

*In Kosovo\*, a co-ordination body composed of heads of key anti-corruption institutions, reviews measures of cross-cutting nature requiring systematic communication between the leaders of different institutions.*

<sup>70</sup> Tilman Hoppe/Council of Europe, Designing and Implementing Anti-corruption Policies, 2013 (see above footnote 64), page 58.

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Often, monitoring and coordination of implementation fall into the competence of one and the same body. They may also be separated into **two bodies**. Having two separate bodies will involve more resources; however, it can also mean that there is a wider diversity and different levels of stakeholders in the monitoring and implementation process.

## 5 How to ensure compliance

The main incentive for a public entity to perform well in implementing anti-corruption activities lies in the **public access** to reporting: it creates a healthy competition with society at large watching. To this end, it is important to ensure veracity of the reported data (see above section 3.2 at “Proceeding”). Without verifying progress reports, compliance will have to rely “blindly” on the proper performance of all implementation bodies.

**Result-oriented management** facilitates achieving objectives: head of state bodies should agree with each of their departments on including anti-corruption actions with the timelines in the action plan into the annual setting of goals. Within each department, heads should reach similar agreements with their staff.

*The Serbian Strategy of 2013-2018 foresees misdemeanor fines if an entity obliged in the Action Plan does not submit a report on implementation. The anti-corruption agency can also draft and publish its own assessment on progress made.*

Monitoring bodies should not only react to the progress made, but explain from the beginning to each agency and staff their particular roles and responsibilities, and point out the benefits of doing so.<sup>71</sup> Putting action plans into practice should not be left to the self-initiative of each institution without providing enough advice and build-up of capacity to deal with sometimes complex policies. Sending out a letter with instructions and timelines will usually not be enough. **Trainings** for government bodies to fulfil their role in implementing the anti-corruption policies and reporting on progress are necessary.

**Regional and local governments** can be a special challenge for monitoring bodies: they are a bit further away from the national level and they regularly enjoy a certain autonomy. Therefore, the monitoring and coordination bodies have to actively reach out to regional and local stakeholders. This will support the understanding of these entities

<sup>71</sup> This paragraph largely leans on: Tilman Hoppe/Council of Europe, Designing and Implementing Anti-corruption -Policies, 2013 (see above footnote 64), page 59.



on what proper reporting means, and what is expected from them in order to implement the foreseen actions. The reporting on progress of anti-corruption reforms might use the same or similar channels as are used for other reporting systems, such as on budget or public administration reform. This means that, for example, a national body coordinating regional and local entities, such as a ministry for local affairs, can also coordinate reporting and compliance for anti-corruption measures on the regional and local level.

**On-site audits** are a strong tool for ensuring compliance. They also facilitate the exchange of information between the monitoring body and the implementing entities. The trigger for an on-site audit should be in particular one of the following two cases:

- The information provided in the **monitoring reports** is – and remains despite reminders – incomplete or inconclusive.
- There are substantiated **complaints** or other indications that the information in the monitoring reports is a flagrantly beautified image of reality.

In any case, the monitoring body should have discretion for starting an audit; thus, all implementing entities would always expect the possibility of an audit, which might already provide an incentive for compliance.

The on-site audit would consist of on-site **interviews** with relevant stakeholders from the implementing entity. It could also include interviews with third parties related to that entity, such as citizens and public agencies. The audit would also look into relevant **data**, such as internal orders or statistics on public service.

There is no need for the whole monitoring body to be present at the audit. To this end, it can form a **working group**, which ideally should also include external observers such as experts on the substance matter (for example, in the case of a ministry of health, a healthcare specialist) and civil society representatives.

*In Moldova, the National Anti-corruption Centre has the possibility to carry out "monitoring on the field". In the past, a few on-site visits took place following progress reports of low quality. The special commission formed for this purpose can include experts and civil society representatives. Implementing entities have to follow the recommendations given by the special commission. The commission's report is available to the public on the Centre's website.*

The audit should result in **recommendations**, which should be available to the **public**. The whole monitoring body should follow up on progress with regards to the recommendations.



## CHAPTER 3 EVALUATION

Evaluating anti-corruption policies consists of two main steps:

- Reviewing the overall **relevance** and **success** of an anti-corruption policy which is at least partially implemented;
- Providing **recommendations** on updating the anti-corruption policy.

### 1 Sources of information

Evaluations base their analysis and findings on the following sources:

- **Reports** by the monitoring body on **progress** towards indicators;
- **Risk assessments** carried out in different sectors of society;
- Feedback by state bodies and **civil society** stakeholders;
- Recommendations from **international monitoring** exercises.

### 2 Stakeholders

Evaluation can also be a function of the monitoring and coordination **commission**. It can also be a task of a separate second or even third body (if different bodies perform monitoring and coordination). While monitoring looks at progress in implementation, evaluation is focused on the impact of anti-corruption policies. As this might be a highly politicised question, the external input by **civil society** stakeholders and **international organisations** is even more important for evaluations than for monitoring. At the same time, it is important to involve the implementing state bodies into the process of evaluation: **self-evaluation** not only secures first-hand insights, but also deepens involvement and ownership of the anti-corruption policy throughout all sectors and layers of society.

*The Romanian Strategy for 2012-2015 foresees an ex-post evaluation of the impact of the strategy, possibly carried out by contracted external evaluators.*

### 3 Frequency

Evaluations need to take place at least **once** during the time-span of an anti-corruption strategy. The longer the time span, the greater is the necessity to have **intermittent** evaluations. Ideally, evaluations take place **every year**.





#### 4 Recommendations for updating the strategy and action plan

The ultimate goal of an evaluation is to provide recommendations for updating the strategy and action plan. Such recommendations comprise:

- New objectives;
- New actions;
- Redefined indicators;
- More realistic timelines;
- Change of responsible stakeholders.

*The Bulgarian Strategy of 2009 undergoes regular updates on the basis of reports analyzing the implementation of actions.*

#### 5 Public access

It goes without saying that evaluation reports need to be fully public. The public at large needs to know which actions were successful and which were not.

**Annex: Ten Principles of Effective Monitoring and Evaluation***Principle 1 – Sound indicators*

*Well formulated indicators are the basis for clear and comprehensive monitoring. They need to call for specific, measurable, qualitative, and quantitative data. Reporting on progress towards indicators should go beyond limitations which indicators sometimes contain. It should provide the monitoring body and the public with all information they might look for in the context of each indicator.*

*Principle 2 – Reporting by state bodies*

*Each state entity responsible for the implementation of a certain action should be responsible for reporting on progress. State bodies should ideally report at least twice a year to ensure public scrutiny of progress. Any paper-based reporting requires templates. For ease of following the numerous activities, a system of enumeration of objectives and activities is recommended in action plans, and the same enumeration should be followed in the reports. Information from other sources should serve to complement and countercheck the data submitted by state bodies. Reports should contain quantitative data on the overall level of implementation, combined with a matrix on the quantitative and qualitative status of each action.*

*Principle 3 – Usage of IT-tools*

*IT-solutions facilitate structured input, render paper work obsolete, provide data in real time, and allow for easy public reporting. Ideally, the monitoring body is connected through a web application with all reporting entities. Whenever an online reporting system is not available, offline software can support the aggregation and analysis of all institutional reports. As an alternative, reports should still be in electronic format sent by email to be consolidated into one table, or such tables could be shared online.*

*Principle 4 – Incentives for reporting*

*Incentives should be available to facilitate reporting. This includes clear institutional and individual responsibility for reporting; clear instructions; high-level endorsement; public availability of progress reports; IT-support; and the possibility of on-site audits by the monitoring group.*

*Principle 5 – Monitoring bodies*

*Monitoring bodies – if a collegial body – should comprise of a diversity of stakeholders, including civil society, or – if an agency – ensure input from various stakeholders; should*



*meet at least as often as is the frequency of reporting; should have political weight by its location or level of members; should employ staff with relevant expertise; and should promote its work to the public.*

#### *Principle 6 – Public access*

*Public access of progress reports can increase pressure and demand for change. It provides a strong incentive for public bodies to comply with benchmarks contained in indicators. It furthermore allows the public at large to scrutinise how the government lives up to its commitments. Public access means putting all progress reports online in machine-readable format to allow for key word search or for migrating part of the data for further analysis by civil society organisations. Similar is true for evaluation reports.*

#### *Principle 7 – Participation of civil society*

*Inclusion of civil society in monitoring and evaluating strategies ensures ownership of the process by a large societal basis. Civil society representatives should be included in any monitoring/coordination commission and its working groups (e.g. for on-site audits), should have access to progress reports, and the monitoring/coordination commission as well as implementing state bodies should take their comments on the implementation of anti-corruption strategies into consideration.*

#### *Principle 8 – Coordination*

*Monitoring is not just taking note of progress reports; monitoring bodies also have to steer activities into the right direction. To this end, the monitoring/coordination commission and implementing state bodies have to show leadership; communicate; review compliance with timelines; allocate resources; and update parts of an action plan in need of review or re-design. Coordination of activities has to reach out to the regional and local levels to ensure inclusion of all stakeholders and flow of information between all levels of government.*

#### *Principle 9 – Ensuring compliance*

*Accessibility of progress reports to the public creates a healthy competition between public entities. Implementation bodies should apply result-oriented management with their staff to facilitate achieving objectives. In addition, it is indispensable for monitoring bodies to not only react to the progress made, but explain from the beginning to each agency and staff their particular role and responsibility, and point out the benefit of doing so. The possibility of on-site audits by the monitoring body provides an additional incentive for implementing entities to comply with the action plan.*



*Principle 10 – Evaluations*

*It is necessary to review the overall success of an anti-corruption policy at least once during its time-span. The evaluation should be transparent and result in recommendations on updating the existing anti-corruption policy or on designing a follow-up one.*





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