Corruption strengthens our democracy!





'Corruption at its core leaves us with a dilemma: While strong judicial, political, and administrative structures are essential to the creation and perpetuation of market economies, these structures are woefully undermined if they are themselves permeated by market mentality.' (Hutchcroft, 2000: 115)

`The key to success in business lies in honesty: if you manage to get rid of it, you've done it.' (Groucho Marx cited by Castresana, UNODC, 2004: 53)



Trast Social Intract Rule of law

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"state capture" shaping and effecting the formulation of the rule of the game through private payments/bribes to public officials/politicians

"failed states"

States that are consumed by internal violence and cease delivering political goods to their inhabitants. [Rotberg]



Paolo Mauro's regression analysis found that a 2,4 decline in the corruption index is associated with a four percentage point increase in the per capita growth rate. A 2,38 drop in the a/m index correlates to an increase in government spending on education by around half a percent of the **GDP. A 0,78 increase in the growth rate of** corruption is linked to a severe decline of 7,8 percentage points per year in the rate of income growth among the poor.

(Paolo Mauro in Lipset et al., 2000: 114)





Data 2006



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Country		CPI	Failed S	Failed States Index		Freedom House	
	Score	Ranking	Score	Ranking	Polit. R	Civil R	
Austria	8,6	11	26,0	12	1	1	
Belgium	7,3	20	25,5	11	1	1	
Denmark	9,5	4	22,2	8	1	1	
Finland	9,6	1	18,5	2	1	1	
France	7,4	18	34,1	21	1	1	
Germany	8,0	16	38,4	24	1	1	
Greece	4,4	54	43,5	31	1	2	
Ireland	7,4	18	19,5	4	1	1	
Italy	4,9	45	37,1	22	1	1	
Luxembourg	8,6	11	28,1	13	1	1	
Netherlands	8,7	9	28,6	15	1	1	
Portugal	6,6	26	32,4	16	1	1	
Spain	6,8	23	39,2	25	1	1	
Sweden	9,2	6	19,3	3	1	1	
UK	8,6	11	34,1	21	1	1	
Bulgaria	4,0	57	60,3	50	1	2	
Czech Republic	4,8	46	42,1	29	1	1	
Cyprus	5,6	37	70,2	65	1	1	
Estonia	6,7	24	50,5	38	1	1	
Hungary	5,2	41	51,2	39	1	1	
Latvia	4,7	49	56,7	43	1	1	
Lithuania	4,8	46	49,0	35	1	1	
Malta	6,4	28	48,5	34	1	1	
Poland	3,7	61	47,6	33	1	1	
Romania	3,1	84	60,9	52	2	2	
Slovakia	4,7	49	49,3	36	1	1	
Slovenia	6,4	28	37,5	23	1	1	
	E ANG AND MUCH	C. Marketter	A Contractory	A STRUCTURE AND	-	15 - 10-	
Albania	2,6	111	70,5	67	3	3	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	2,9	93	84,5	124	4	3	
Croatia	3,4	69	60,5	51	2	2	
FYR Macedonia	2,7	105	74,1	83	3	3	
Moldova	3,2	79	85,7	130	3	4	
Montenegro	n/a	n/a	55,6	42	3	3	
Serbia	3,0	90	81,1	112	3	2	
Sudan	2,0	156	113,7	177	7	7	
Guinea	1,9	160	101,3	169	6	5	
Iraq	1,9	160	111,4	176	6	5	
Myanmar	1,9	160	97,0	164	7	7	
Haiti	1,8	163	100,9	167	4	5	

<u>Diagram 1, CPI vs. FSI</u>: a high rate in the Corruption Perception Index goes along with a high risk of state failure.



Diagram 2, CPI vs. FHI: a low corruption correlates with a high standard of political/civil rights.



Diagram 3, FSI vs. FHI: high risk of state failure links with lack of political/civil rights.



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4 pillar Approach:







Prevention Education Repression & Cooperation

No real success unless: Awareness-raising !

(civil society 🛱 transparency 🛱 societal security, et cetera)

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International Cooperation:

Chapter IV, Art 43-50 UNCAC Chapter II, Art 13 Civil Law Convention on Corruption, CoE

 Chapter IV, Art 25-31 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, CoE

 Art 9-12 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officals in International Business Transaction, OECD

• et altera





www.epac.at





<u>Status quo:</u>

 different organisations different standards different role-models different competencies different focus different terms of reference different jurisdiction • watering down in some areas ?!?

Art 6 & Art 36 UNCAC: **.... be granted** the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental principles of the legal system of the State Party, to be able to carry out their functions effectively and without undue influence.'

FEDERAL MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR FEDERAL BUREAU FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

International (legal) instruments & mechanisms

- Best practices
- Mutual legal assistance
- Asset recovery (UNCAC)
- Monitoring mechanisms (GRECO, ...)
- Conferences & Networks
- JIT
- Staff exchange
- bi-lateral agreements
- et cetera

RECO, ...)





'In investigating corruption allegations you regularly have to stir in murky waters, you have to deal with the intelligent, the most rescourceful and the real powerful. The burden of proof lies with the investigators, and the investigational and judicial chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Even if the chain stays solid, your day may end still missing the final but necessary piece of evidence in the obvious corruptive mosaic. Subsequently, you are nolens volens instrumentalized in supposedly proofing the "innocence" of the corrupt."



Impediments to asset recovery:



Political will ↔ political clique ...
 Principle of sovereignty ↔ non-interference
 Systems of immunities
 Dual criminality
 Pecunia non olet.
 Different legal systems & loopholes in legislation
 Systems of banksecrecy and data protection
 Double standards



Impediments to asset recovery:







2008 in EU:

ITA, RUM, LAT, SLOV?, AUT?,

<u>& beyond:</u> S-Africa, Kenia, ...







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There is enough on earth for everybody's need, but not enough for anybody's greed.

(Mahatma Ghandi)





Crime must not pay – everywhere, i.e. in countries of origin but also in countries of destination.

(Expert Group on Stolen Asset Recovery, The World Bank / UNODC, 2009)



Corruption makes our country safer!

